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Resumen
En este artículo usamos un modelo VAR para analizar cómo responde el ciclo económico chileno a
shocks, y la capacidad de la economía chilena de resistirlos (resiliencia). Entre las novedades de
nuestro análisis están la introducción de un conjunto ampliado de variables para capturar el impacto
de los shocks externos e internos, incluyendo variables de política; el uso de una muestra ampliada
desde los años cincuenta, y la introducción de exogeneidad en bloque para capturar la condición de
economía pequeña y abierta y para mejorar el manejo de temas de identificación. Entre los resultados
principales, encontramos que los shocks externos han sido la fuente predominante de fluctuaciones del
ciclo económico, seguidos por los shocks de política monetaria, en tanto los shocks de política fiscal
explican relativamente poco; y que a pesar de la mayor sincronía entre el ciclo económico interno y
las condiciones internacionales, la resiliencia de la economía chilena frente a los shocks externos
aumentó durante los noventa, un hecho positivo en el que las políticas contracíclicas jugaron un papel
importante.
Abstract
In this paper we use a VAR model to analyze the response of the Chilean business cycle to shocks and
the capacity of the Chilean economy to withstand them (resilience).  Novel features in the analysis
include the introduction of an expanded set of variables to capture the impact of external shocks and
domestic shocks —including policy variables; the use of an extended sample since the 1950s; and the
introduction of block exogeneity to capture the small open economy feature and to better deal with
identification issues. Among key results, we find that foreign shocks have been the dominant source of
business cycle fluctuations, followed by monetary policy shocks, while fiscal policy shocks explain
relatively little; and that despite of the increased synchronization of the domestic business cycle with
international conditions, the resilience of the Chilean economy to external shocks has increased during
the nineties, with countercyclical policies playing an important role in such a positive development.
________________
Prepared for the Eight Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile: “External Financial
Vulnerability and Preventive Policies", held in Santiago, August 10-11, 2004. We thank conference
participants —in particular, our discussant Francisco Rosende, Ricardo Caballero, César Calderón,
Luis Felipe Céspedes, and Pablo Neumeyer— as well seminar participants at the IMF Institute, and
Alex Hofmmaister for useful suggestions and comments. The views expressed in this paper are those
of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF.
E-mails: hfranken@imf.org; glefort@zahleryco.cl; eparrado@bcentral.cl.1
I.   INTRODUCTION
After marked fluctuations in the business cycle of the last half of the century, the
Chilean economy appears less volatile and more resilient to external shocks. Being Chile a
small and increasingly open economy, the amplitude of the cyclical fluctuations that have
characterized the business cycle over the years have been always suspected to be closely
related to changes in external conditions.
1 However, many open questions still remain in this
regard. To what extent the pronounced output fluctuations are associated with ups and downs
in external conditions, and to what extent they can be attributed to domestic sources? Are real
or financial external shocks the most important sources of fluctuations? Has the increasing
international integration implied greater synchronization of the domestic cycle with the
external economic conditions? Does the latter imply greater external vulnerability or, on the
contrary, resilience to external shocks has somewhat improved?
In trying to answer these kind of questions, we adopt an empirical approach using a
vector autoregressive (VAR) model with block exogeneity. We take the VAR model, adapt it
to focus on the behavior of a small open economy, and use it to characterize and decompose
the behavior of the Chilean business cycle. Since our model includes a comprehensive set of
variables, we can evaluate the importance of both external, policy, and other domestic
variables in the business cycle. In this context, we are able to assess how the economy has
responded to different stochastic disturbances that have affected it, to measure the
contribution of these variables to the business cycle fluctuations, and to analyze the resilience
of the Chilean economy over the last half of the century.
A key feature in our analysis comes from imposing some plausible restrictions on
relations among variables, following recent developments in model specification and
estimation procedures to estimate the VAR model. Like Cushman and Zha (1997), Dungey
and Pagan (2000), Hoffmaister and Roldós (2001), and Buckle et al (2002), we use block
exogeneity for international variables to capture the small open economy feature in the
associated dynamic responses and for domestic policy variables to better deal with
identification issues.
Several interesting results emerge from this analysis. First, real and financial external
shocks have significant effects on domestic economic activity. The significant impact in the
cyclical behavior of the economy following the financial external shocks represented by the
volatility of the international financial markets and the net capital inflows is a reflection of
the financial restrictions faced by an emerging economy like Chile. Among domestic policy
                                                
1 For a review of empirical regularities characterizing business cycles in Chile, see Belaisch and Soto (1998)
and, more recently, Bergoeing and Suarez (2001). For a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model applied to Chilean
data, see Bergoeing and Soto (forthcoming).2
shocks, demand management policies and structural policies affect the business cycle
fluctuations, as it is also the case of other domestic shocks such as investors confidence.
Altogether, however, foreign shocks have been the dominant source of domestic output
fluctuations, followed by monetary policy and structural policies while fiscal policy and
domestic equity explain a relatively low fraction of the volatility of the business cycle.
Second, we provide evidence of an increased resilience of the Chilean economy to external
shocks during the nineties. Such a positive development has taken place even as the deeper
integration of the economy with the rest of the world has resulted in an increased
synchronization of the domestic business cycle with international conditions, which
underscores the significant countercyclical role played by policies.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a historical overview of the
Chilean economy since 1950. Here, the paper outlines the main issues related to growth,
recessions, and cyclical behavior. Section III presents a description of the data and the
methodological issues associated to the VAR framework. Section IV analyzes the impact of
foreign, policy, and other domestic shocks on the business cycle and the sources of its
fluctuations; while Section V provides insights on the shock resilience of the economy using
historical decomposition analysis. The final section summarizes the results and their
implications for economic policy.
II.   HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY SINCE 1950
A.   Growth and Recessions
Over the last half of the century the GDP growth rate of the Chilean economy
displays an upward sloping trend, with a starting point around 3 percent in the early fifties, a
mid-point around 4 percent in the early seventies, and an ending point around 5 percent
towards the end of the sample period in 2003.  The initial period is characterized by frequent
but relatively moderate peaks and troughs as well as a somewhat low but stable medium-term
growth rate.  Between the seventies and the nineties, however, two very deep recessions took
place, with their troughs observed in 1975 and 1982, respectively.
2  From 1990 onwards,
peaks and troughs return to be moderate as in the first period, but with a significantly higher
medium-term growth rate (Figure 1).
Recessions have not been uncommon during the 53 years covered in our sample
(1950-2003). Indeed, there are 6 periods of negative growth. Two of them in the fifties (1954
and 1959), three of them between the early seventies and the early eighties (1972-73, 1975,
and 1982-83) and only one of them in the late nineties (1999).
The relatively moderate recessions of the fifties are associated to important domestic
economic policy events.  The recession in 1954 came about after the very large monetary
expansion at the beginning of the government of Carlos Ibañez (1952-58), followed by a
                                                
2 Observed fluctuations in the annual growth rate were as large as 24 percent, e.g. from -13.6 percent in 1982 to
10.6 percent in 1989.3
surge in inflation, and then a stabilization program under the Klein-Sacks mission.
3  But price
stability was not conquered then, and the efforts of the Alessandri’s administration (1958-
1964) to use the exchange rate as a tool for controlling inflation ended in the second
recession, that of 1959, when the fixed parity of the Chilean currency
4 against the US dollar
collapsed.  Since then, and until the early seventies, there were slowdowns in economic
activity, but no other recession took place.
5
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The recessions between the seventies and the eighties were more frequent and much
deeper and included a full blown economic and financial crisis. The 1972-73 recession was a
result of a deep social and political crisis during the Allende’s administration (1970-73)
which ended up with a military coup and 17 years of authoritarian rule.
6 A sharp
deterioration in external conditions, particularly of the terms of trade during a period with
very limited access to external financing due to the recent political turmoil of the early
seventies, lead to the 1975-76 recession. Such a recession was followed by a period of rapid
growth, which ended all the sudden with the deep and prolonged recession of 1982-83, the
second of the Pinochet regime (1973-1990), and the worst during the period of analysis. This
recession resulted from a sudden stop in capital inflows that forced the reversal of the
(unsustainable) current account deficit. As the terms of trade deteriorated and the
international real interest rates peaked, the adjustment required a sharp real exchange rate
depreciation. The vulnerabilities of the banking system aggravated the recession. The very
rapid increase in bank credit during the late seventies and early eighties—largely associated
to foreign currency loans and connected lending— resulted in a severe deterioration of the
loan portfolio and very high exposure to exchange rate risk. Although the fiscal balance was
                                                
3 Ffrench Davis (1973) and Zahler (1977) contain detailed discussions of the economic policies applied in Chile
in the 1950s and 1960s.
4 The escudo at that time.
5 The period 1964-70 corresponds to Frei-Montalva’s  administration.
6 A complete discussion of the policies of the Allende’s administration and of the economic reforms during the
Pinochet regime can be found in Edwards and Cox-Edwards (1987).4
in surplus and public debt was nil, the peso came under severe market pressures that
precipitated the second collapse of a fixed parity in the last fifty years of Chilean economic
history. Notwithstanding the economy wide crisis, a default on external debt was avoided to a
large extent thanks to the initial low level of public debt.
During the nineties, the short-lived and quite mild recession of 1999 is the only one
observed, perhaps due to the stronger resilience built throughout years of significant reforms
and institutional changes, including the contributions of a solid banking system and a
coherent macroeconomic policy framework.
7 In the 1998-99 episode, as the previous ones of
1975 and 1982, a sharp deterioration in external conditions required a reversal in the current
account deficit, yet this time from a much moderate level. The private sector reacted reducing
domestic demand and adjusting asset portfolios to increase the holding of net foreign assets.
The latter, together with the sharp contraction in the supply of external financing, exerted
strong pressures over the exchange rate.  Perhaps the recession could have been avoided if
monetary policy would not have over reacted to limit currency depreciation by narrowing the
exchange rate band.
8 The monetary authority feared that the currency depreciation may lead
to an acceleration of inflation above the target and to financial system distress associated to
the foreign currency exposures. Thus, domestic real interest rates reached extraordinarily
high levels and economic activity dipped. The over reaction was evident when, the following
year, inflation fell below the floor of the target range, while the financial system did not
experience any substantial problems.  However, it was rapidly corrected as the exchange rate
was let to float in the last quarter of 1999 and interest rates entered in a prolonged phase of
sustained reductions that have been instrumental for the recovery.
Most observers of the Chilean economy are of the view that the outstanding
performance of the economy during the nineties can be explained in terms of the process of
reforms and stabilization that began in the seventies and continued during most of the
eighties and the nineties.  The legitimacy offered by a peaceful transition to democracy,
additional opening up of the economy, further development of domestic financial markets
including a deeper integration to international financial markets, and a significant
strengthening of the macroeconomic policy framework including fiscal consolidation and a
successful price stabilization have been considered key factors.  Since the late nineties, the
fiscal authorities adopted a self-imposed rule that targets a structural surplus of 1 percent of
GDP while allowing the automatic stabilizers to operate throughout the cycle. And, since the
early nineties, the Central Bank was given full operational and administrative independence,
and its Board of Directors adopted an inflation targeting regime that has been improved over
the years. Given the currently supportive external environment, and the strength of its policy
framework and institutional arrangements, Chile is very well positioned to return soon to
faster medium-term growth.
                                                
7 The prolonged slowdown of the economy that followed the downturn, which is only recently coming to an
end, has mirrored the unsupportive external environment that prevailed until recently.
8 See Le Fort (2000).5
B.   GDP Cycles
In this paper we measured the Chilean business cycle over the last half of the century
as the deviations of GDP from its long-term trend (using Hodrick-Prescott filter). As shown
in Figure 2, the evolution of the output gap over the sample period is anything but
monotonous, with marked fluctuations and changing patterns.  There are different ways of
dating the cycles, and that can deliver different results in terms of identifying specific cycles.
In the approach herein followed, eight different cycles are identified as presented in Table 1.
9
The average length of the cycle —which includes a low and a high phase— is seven years.
A pattern that is very clear is that the cycles until the mid sixties were much shorter (around
five years on average).  The amplitude of the cycles also increased over time, until reaching a
maximum in the fifth and sixth cycle (1969-76 and 1976-84) to decline substantially in the
last two.
Table 1:  Chile GDP Cycles 1950-2003
Platforms Duration Max Gap Min Gap Volatility
1950-55 5.5 5.6 -1.5 2.8
1955-58 4.0 3.8 -3.5 3.9
1958-64 6.0 0.9 -5.6 2.1
1964-69 5.0 3.4 -4.2 3.1
1969-76 7.0 9.8 -14.8 9.4
1976-84 8.0 15.2 -7.4 8.3
1984-90 6.0 0.5 -6.8 2.6
1990-04 14.5 6.6 -3.2 3.3
Average 7.0 5.7 -5.9 4.4
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9 The discussion in Cashin (2004) is illustrative in terms of how cycle dating depends on a set of the self-
imposed rules, the series over which those rules are applied, and the starting point of the sample, among other
things. The cycle dating of Table 1 follows closely one set of rules contained in that paper.6
The fifties and sixties were periods in which the economy was fairly closed to the rest
of the world, with external demand conditions displaying very low correlation with the
Chilean business cycle. Hence, despite the relatively unfavorable external demand and terms
of trade, the economy was rather insulated, with an output gap that was close to zero on
average, and with relatively low volatility.  In contrast, the volatility of the output gap
increased substantially between the seventies and eighties —along with the magnitude of the
cyclical changes— and the average output gap was negative. Also, the volatility of most
other variables is the highest of the three periods, including that of external demand
conditions, terms of trade, net capital flows, growth in real balances, and fiscal expenditure.
As we show in section V, however, the volatility of the output gap relative to that of
international conditions as a whole increased substantially during this period.  Finally, in the
nineties, the output gap has been positive on average, and its volatility moderated
significantly (Figure 2 and Table 2).
III.   METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
A.   Data
The data used in this paper is of annual frequency and covers the period 1950-2003.
Our empirical model includes 12 variables, derived from both international and domestic
series.  International series are used to construct five variables intended to measure real and
financial external shocks. Domestic variables include a proxy for the Chilean business cycle,
namely GDP gap, which is our main object of interest, a group of five variables aimed to
control for domestic policy shocks, and a variable meant to capture domestically-driven
financial shocks.  Table 2 summarizes the 12 variables that are included in our empirical
model.
Note that most of variables are measured in terms of gaps, i.e. deviations from the
long-term trend calculated through a Hodrick-Prescott filter.
10 Our first variable is a proxy
for the external demand conditions relevant to the Chilean economy, and is constructed from
sectoral indices of World Merchandise Export Volume published by the World Trade
Organization (WTO).
11 In order to aggregate them in a single index that captures the
dynamism of the external demand for Chilean products, we use the sectoral share of Chilean
exports. As with most domestic series, the source used to construct the sectoral share of
Chilean exports is Braun et. al. (2000), publication that contains many series for the Chilean
Economy during the period 1810-1995.
12 For the extension of the export shares series until
2003, our source is Central Bank of Chile (CBCh). The same combination of sources is used
                                                
10 In order to prevent the typical tail problems common to this type of filtering process, we use data of up to five
years prior to 1950, when available.  We also use forecasts of up to two years for those variables that are
included in gaps, based on official forecasts when available.  These “extra” observations are then dropped.
11  The sectoral indices include agricultural products, mining products and manufactures.  See “Merchandise
exports, production and gross domestic product, 1950-2003” in http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e.htm.
12 The publication is part of a series of documents that include also Jeftánovic et. al. (2000 and 2003) which
purpose is the recompilation of long-span statistics for a large set of variables for the Chilean economy.7
to obtain the terms of trade, variable that represents the other real external shock in our
empirical model.
13

























(a) Main variable of interest
(a) Dev. of log from HP trend.
(b) Dev. of real rate or return from HP trend.
(c) Dev. of std. dev. of real returns  from HP trend.
  The annual
standard deviation is calculated from daily data.
(d) Dev. of ratio over GDP from HP trend.
(e) Ratio over GDP.
(f) Real growth rate.
The other three external variables are intended to measure financial shocks faced by
the Chilean economy. Firstly, the foreign real interest rate corresponds to the average
secondary market rate of the 3-Month Treasury bill minus the annual CPI inflation of the US
economy (source: IMF). Secondly, we include a foreign equity variable as a proxy for the
uncertainty of international financial markets. This variable is constructed by taking the
annual standard deviation of daily real returns from the Dow Jones index (source: New York
Stock Exchange, NYSC). Thirdly, net capital inflows to the Chilean Economy as percentage
of GDP is calculated as the current account deficit net of international reserves accumulation
over GDP until 1988 (Braun et. al.) and it is directly taken from the Balance of Payments
Statistics of the CBCh onwards.
Most domestic variables are related to policy shocks. The first one—the de facto
openness of the Chilean economy, i.e. the exports and imports share of GDP— is constructed
until 1987 as the sum of export and imports in Chilean pesos taken from Jeftánovic et. al.
(2000), deflated by the Chilean CPI taken from Jeftánovic et. al. (2003), and divided by real
GDP taken from Braun et. al. (2000); and from 1989 onwards the source is the Balance of
Payments Statistics of the CBCh. The second variable—the real growth of money— is taken
                                                
13 In an alternative specification of the model the terms of trade is replaced by two variables: the real price of oil
and copper (source: IMF).8
from the Monetary and Financial Statistics of the CBCh, available since 1960, and
complemented with Jeftánovic et. al. (2003) for the previous period. We use two variables as
proxies for fiscal policy, namely the real growth of fiscal revenue and fiscal expenditure.
These two variables are taken from Jeftánovic et. al. (2000) up to 1986, and from the
Budgetary Office of the Chilean Ministry of Finance (DIPRES) onwards. Finally the real
exchange rate is taken from Jeftánovic et. al. (2003) until 1989, and from the CBCh onwards.
We also include domestic equity, a variable aimed to capture business confidence.
This variable is constructed as the real returns of the stock index (IPSA), which are taken
from Braun et. al. until 1969 and from the Santiago Stock Exchange onwards.
Last but not least, and indeed our main variable of interest, the business cycle is
constructed with data on real GDP taken from Braun et. al. until 1995 and the CBCh
onwards. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of the 12 variables that are included in our
empirical model plus oil and copper prices:























50-69 -0.8 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.0 -1.0 22.1 0.1 2.4 3.0 0.1 2.1 7.0 6.8
70-90 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.4 1.3 32.3 -0.2 -0.8 -3.0 -0.7 7.6 2.7 3.4
91-03 0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -1.0 -1.2 -3.9 44.7 0.1 -1.5 1.0 1.4 9.6 6.3 6.9
50-03 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.2 -0.8 31.5 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 6.1 5.2 5.5
50-69 4.9 1.7 3.4 11.6 8.4 11.9 5.6 1.0 13.1 21.1 2.9 14.8 13.3 8.8
70-90 6.4 1.6 4.7 14.1 28.5 17.6 11.7 3.3 24.7 30.6 7.6 22.9 8.7 14.6
91-03 2.3 1.2 3.3 5.6 16.0 15.3 3.9 2.4 7.3 36.0 3.3 6.6 5.6 3.1
50-03 5.1 1.5 3.9 11.4 19.8 15.0 12.0 2.4 17.5 28.5 5.3 17.2 10.2 10.6
50-69 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.4 -0.3 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.1
70-90 0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.5 -0.4 0.3 1.0 0.4 0.1 0.4
91-03 0 . 50 . 5- 0 . 40 . 3- 0 . 30 . 5- 0 . 60 . 3- 0 . 8- 0 . 61 . 0- 0 . 20 . 10 . 2
50-03 0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.4 -0.3 0.1 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.3
Average per Period
Standard Deviation per Period
Correlation Cofficient of Variable Against Output Gap per Period
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables9
B.   Specification
We use a VAR model of the Chilean economy that contains 12 equations
corresponding to each of the variables described above. To achieve identification of the
structural parameters we follow the popular and straightforward approach known as Choleski
decomposition. However, we depart from this traditional VAR approach by imposing block
exogeneity restrictions consistent with the fact that the Chilean economy is a small open
economy, meaning that domestically determined variables cannot affect the international
block. Indeed, this approach—which let us to reduce the overall number of parameters
estimated for most equations—together with our relatively large annual sample, enable us to
estimate a VAR with such a large number of endogenous variables. Moreover, the dynamic
structure of this model based on annual frequency data is adequately handled by including
only one lag.
14 The block exogeneity approach for small open economies was an extension
firstly used by Cushman and Zha (1997) for the Canadian economy. More lately, Dungey and
Pagan (2000), Hoffmaister and Roldós (2001), and Buckle et. al. (2002) used such an
approach in applications to Australia, Brazil and Korea, and New Zealand, respectively.
Thus, the equations in our model are arranged in a way that takes into account the fact
that a Choleski decomposition identification scheme depends theoretically on the order of the
equations, with the lag structure of the model consistent with the small open economy case.
15
Table 4 summarizes the order of the equations and the lag structure of the model.
Note first that most of the equations of variables pertaining to the international block
precede the equations of variables pertaining to the domestic block. Thus, the first three
international variables—external demand conditions, foreign interest rate, and uncertainty in
international financial markets—are completely exogenous to the other variables included in
the model but are interrelated among each other. That differs from the case of the terms of
trade, which is affected (only) by the previous three variables but does not affect them.
16
However, the last variable of the international block, net capital inflows to the Chilean
economy, features no lag restrictions, since it could be potentially affected by all the
variables included in the model, and it is allowed to be contemporaneously affected by the
four international variables that precede it in terms of the order of the equations. The lag
                                                
14 This is unlikely to be the case for a model based on data with quarterly frequency, which presumably may
require four lags. The latter feature together with the fact that quarterly data for most of the series that we use in
this model are available only since 1986, and some of them only since the early 1990s, prevents the estimation
of a VAR with a large set of endogenous variables for Chile based on quarterly data.
15 It is worth mentioning that some different orders were considered without apparent changes in the results,
suggesting that the structure of our lag restrictions limits considerably the ordering problem with respect to a
non-restricted (Choleski) VAR.
16 In the alternative specification in which terms of trade is replaced by both oil and copper prices (see footnote
13), the oil price is allowed to affect the external demand conditions, the foreign interest rate, and the
uncertainty in international financial markets, and vice-versa.10
structure of the equation associated to a measure of trade openness, a medium-term oriented


























































The equation that accounts for monetary policy is assumed to depend on the lag of
itself, the foreign real interest rate, capital inflows, the real exchange rate, and the two
variables that are aimed to capture fiscal policy, namely fiscal revenue and fiscal
expenditure. The first one of these two variables is assumed to depend on the lag of itself, the
terms of trade, and the output gap. Finally, fiscal expenditure is assumed to depend on the
lags of itself, output, and fiscal revenue.
  Other equations within the domestic block are those
associated to the real exchange rate, domestic stock returns, and the business cycle. These
equations feature no lag restrictions. The first two of them for being domestic asset prices
and the third one because we do not want to restrict the relationships of our main object of
interest: the business cycle.
It is worth mentioning that the previous VAR specification satisfies the stability
condition as all the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle, and that the evidence presented in
the following sections is robust to several changes. First, in terms of different orderings used
to identify the orthogonal shocks, there were no major qualitatively changes in the results of
the paper. The only evident difference was found once output was shifted to be below
domestic policy conditions: all impulse response functions looked relatively similar, but the
contribution of monetary policy to the business cycle fluctuations was significantly lower in
this case, with almost all the effect being captured by domestic equity.  Second, the results
are also robust to reducing or expanding the variables included in the model.  One of the
                                                
17 Presumably trade openness is correlated with all the external variables including net capital flows
contemporaneously.11
reductions that was considered was the elimination of capital inflows, so as to leave the
whole group of external variables completely block exogenous.
18  In this case, most of the
effect was captured by a higher persistency of the output gap. In terms of expanding the
model, the terms of trade was replaced by two separate variables, namely the real price of oil
and copper, respectively. Again, results were qualitatively similar regarding the relationship
between the other variables and the business cycle. In addition, given Chile’s geographical
characteristics we included a dummy variable to capture natural catastrophes (both
earthquakes and climatic conditions). Contrary to our expectations, domestic output did not
display a statistically significant response to a positive innovation in this natural catastrophes
dummy variable,
19 and all the other variables maintained their impact and significance.
20
IV.   MACROECONOMIC RESPONSES AND SOURCES OF FLUCTUATIONS
A.   External Shocks
Foreign Real Shocks
External demand shock
The responses to a positive innovation to the external demand is shown in Figure 3
Chilean output expands on impact with a lasting effect of around two years. The peak
response occurs in the first year. The external demand shock is also transmitted immediately
into the real exchange rate and the terms of trade in different directions. In particular, the
appreciation of the real exchange rate and its negative effects on output does not offset the
positive effect that is generated with better terms of trade. Economic activity then begins to
drop off in response to tighter monetary policy as the economy began to expand.
                                                
18 Since the model included already two external financial variables (foreign interest rate and international
capital markets uncertainty) it was suggested to us that these two variables might be enough to capture changes
in external financing conditions to the Chilean economy. The evidence, however, pointed towards an
independent effect of capital inflows. To capture such an effect but in a more exogenous way, net capital
inflows to Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico as a percentage of their combined GDP were included instead of net
capital inflows to the Chilean economy. But the former variable turned out to be statistically insignificant,
suggesting that the common factor between capital inflows to the most important Latin American economies
and capital inflows to Chile is not very relevant.
19 Eartquakes and sustained droughts were represented by a dummy variable. Droughts were considered if the
cumulative shortfall from normal rainfall accumulated over the last four years exceeded one year of normal
rainfall - 0.1 standard deviation (308 millimeters per year). Following this definition, years of droughts are
1969, 1970, 1971, 1976, and 1996. Annual data on total rainfall was obtained in the National Office of
Meteorology. Similarly, only earthquakes with a magnitude above 7 in the Richter scale and taking place at less
than 50 kilometers from the surface were considered as a natural disaster with macroeconomic relevance.
Following this definition, years of earthquakes are 1960, 1971, 1975, 1985, and 1995. This data is reported in
Servicio Sismológico (2003).
20 All these estimates are available from the authors upon request.12





































Terms of trade shock
Responses to a rise in terms of trade are shown in Figure 4 and are consistent with
conventional wisdom. In particular, an improvement in the terms of trade implies a positive
impact on the business cycle. The effect on domestic output appears to be higher from the
first year on, with a lasting effect of five years even with a persistence of the terms of trade
shock of only two years.
A terms of trade shock could come from a rise in the price of exports or a fall in the
price of imports. Generally, emphasis has been placed on copper and oil prices in the case of
Chile. An alternative VAR that includes these prices instead of the terms of trade shows that
both shocks have the expected effects on the business cycle, but their respective impulse-
response functions are not statistically significant. This may suggest that the dominant source
to explain business cycle fluctuations are a composite of exports and imports prices and not
copper and oil prices by themselves. Thus, the public discussion of the significant impact of
the copper price over the business cycle may be somewhat overstated.13




























Foreign interest rate shock
The responses to a rise in the foreign interest rate are illustrated in Figure 5. This
shock is transmitted into lower monetary aggregates in the first year. The corresponding
increase in domestic interest rate translates into a lower demand for domestic equities,
reducing its real returns immediately. Consequently, domestic output eventually falls in
response to monetary policy tightening and the fall in equities.






























Figure 6 shows that an increase in the volatility of world equities causes a negative
impact on the real return of Chilean equities and a decline in capital flows. This may reflect
higher external financing costs that could have an impact on the risk premium associated to
emerging markets. Therefore, the combination of these negative forces have an immediate
negative effect over the business cycle that lasts 2 to 3 years.



























Net capital flows shock
The responses to an increase in net capital flows are shown in Figure 7. As expected,
there is an expansion of the business cycle on impact that lasts one year. The latter reflects
the financial restrictions faced by an emerging economy as it is the case of Chile, in the sense
that those restrictions implied that net capital flows with its ups and downs have a significant
impact in the cyclical behavior of the economy.




















B.   Domestic Shocks
Domestic Policy Shocks
Monetary policy shocks
The responses to a monetary policy shock are shown in Figure 8. After an
expansionary monetary policy shock, the impulse-response function for the business cycle
displays a hump-shaped pattern with a peak effect in the first year and a significant
persistence of two years.














The first issue to be resolved in an empirical study of fiscal policy shocks is what
indicator to use as a measure of policy stance. A usual candidate for this role is the fiscal
deficit. There are, however, several well-known problems with this measure that make it a
weak indicator of discretionary fiscal policy. The fiscal deficit captures both exogenous
policy shifts as well as automatic reaction of fiscal variables to the state of the economy. In
addition, even when changes in the deficit reflect purely discretionary policy decisions, it is
obvious that the source of the change —whether it is a revenue adjustment or a change in
government spending— is important for the expected response of the private sector. Thus,
we consider the effects of both expenditure and revenue separately. On one hand, fiscal
expenditures have a higher component of policy discretion. On the other hand, fiscal
revenues are explained not only by fluctuations in the tax regime, but also by endogenous
reactions following changes in economic activity.
Figure 9 shows the responses to a positive innovation to fiscal expenditure and
revenue, respectively. The response of the business cycle is expansionary and statistically
significant in the case of government spending but there is no major response before a
revenue shock, suggesting that domestic demand is relatively unresponsive to changes in
fiscal revenues.
Figure 9: Responses to fiscal policy shocks



















Real exchange rate shocks
A real exchange rate shock has a positive impact on the Chilean business cycle as is
shown in Figure 10. However, the impact on output takes two years to become significant,
lasting for two other years as well.
21










Figure 11 shows that the business cycle reacts positively but with a lag of three years
and a lasting effect of two years to an increase in the openness of the economy.  Since we use
de facto openness, the variable reflects a combination of policy decisions and endogenous
reactions. Assuming that the trajectory of the variable is influenced mostly by policy, greater
openness have helped in moderating the impact of external shocks.










                                                
21 An increase in the real exchange rate represents a real depreciation of the Chilean Peso.18
Other Domestic Shocks
Domestic equity shock
Figure 12 shows the responses to a positive innovation to domestic equity returns.
This financial domestic shock has a positive impact in the business cycle in the first year, but
the effect vanishes thereafter.









C.   Sources of Business Cycle Fluctuations
This section presents the variance decomposition analysis to determine what fraction
of the variance of the Chilean business cycle is attributable to each shock (Table 5).

























0 0.029 9.29 0.51 10.88 0.05 7.44 4.43 67.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 0.044 13.65 3.57 14.21 5.74 4.86 2.16 39.57 11.46 0.02 2.50 0.33 1.95
2 0.047 13.57 4.68 15.43 6.47 4.38 3.33 35.69 11.78 0.10 2.18 0.68 1.71
3 0.048 13.26 4.96 14.77 7.41 4.18 4.96 34.09 11.32 0.10 2.09 1.23 1.63
4 0.049 13.07 4.89 14.42 8.23 4.10 5.83 33.18 11.08 0.10 2.03 1.49 1.59
5 0.049 13.00 4.82 14.30 8.65 4.06 6.08 32.77 11.07 0.11 2.01 1.55 1.57
6 0.049 12.99 4.81 14.27 8.80 4.05 6.12 32.63 11.10 0.11 2.00 1.55 1.56
The results can be summarized as follows: first, foreign shocks have a substantial
effect on business cycle volatility, especially external demand and foreign equity (volatility)
shocks have been the dominant source of domestic output fluctuations. In particular, foreign
shocks represent 28 percent of business cycle fluctuations in the first year, reaching 42
percent from the third year. Second, domestic equity shocks and fiscal policy shocks have
relatively little impact on the business cycle. On the contrary, the fraction of business cycle
fluctuations explained by trade openness and the terms of trade is much larger. Finally,
monetary policy shocks play an important role in explaining the forecasting error variance of
the business cycle.19
V.   SHOCK RESILIENCE OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY
A.   Historical Decomposition
The variance decomposition analysis presented in the previous section confirms the
common wisdom that the fluctuations in Chilean business cycle are largely explained by
external shocks. The prominence of external shocks is due to the condition of being a small
open economy—both to trade and financial flows— with an export structure that is not
sufficiently diversified and with limited access to international financing.  Indeed, compared
to domestic shocks, external shocks explain more than twice as much of the business cycle
fluctuations
A complementary way to analyze the estimation output of a VAR is to look at the
historical decomposition.
22 In particular, in this section we concentrate on analyzing the
effects of different combination of shocks on output, including how the response of output to
those shocks has evolved over time.  Thus, by dividing business cycle fluctuations into
different components —international conditions, policy conditions, other domestic shocks,
and a remainder which includes the inertial or lagged effect and the error term, i.e. other
shocks that are not controlled for— we can assess how the importance of these different
components has evolved over time. Moreover, to the extent that we find that the effects of
international conditions have been moderated by policies, then we would gather support for
the belief that the resilience of the economy to external shocks has increased.
23
Figures 13 and 14 show the business cycle fluctuations divided by the different
components described above. Thus, the international conditions component includes external
shocks—both real (external demand, and terms of trade) and financial (foreign interest rate,
volatility of international financial markets, and net capital flows); the policy conditions
component includes the effects of changes in monetary and fiscal policy (both from the
revenue and expenditure side), as well as the effects of changes in structural policies,
                                                
22 We decompose the historical values of a set of time series into a basis projection and the accumulated effects
of current and past innovations. This decomposition allows us to observe whether movements in the business
cycle were likely the result of a combination of innovations or mostly explained by a specific variable. The
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23 Data limitations prevents using a more straightforward way of looking at this issue, namely the estimation of
separate VARs within two sub samples, which would amount to look for evidence of a structural breaks in the
responses of output to international conditions, policies, and/or other domestic shocks.20
captured by the degree of openness to international trade and the real exchange rate.
24
Finally, other domestic conditions refer to the effect of changes in the domestic stock market
prices that are beyond the medium-term average return, thus trying to capture the animal
spirits.
From Figure 13 it is apparent that cyclical output fluctuations are explained mainly by
international and policy components, while the effect of other domestic shocks appear to be
much smaller.  In addition, the remainder component, lagged output and error term, also
plays an important role owing mainly to the autocorrelation of the output cycle.
As shown in Figure 14, the real and financial international conditions seem to have
had similar contributions to the cyclical fluctuations of output, and the total effect of
international conditions on the output cycle do not show significant changes in terms of
magnitude across the sample.  This is not the case of the policy component, which appears to
have had more wide effects on the cycle in the first two-thirds of the sample period.  Insofar
the policy components are concerned, the effects on cyclical output fluctuations of monetary
and fiscal policy is larger that that of exchange rate and trade policies (structural component).
The rest of this section contains a more in depth analysis on the basis of the statistical
properties of the historical decomposition.
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24 We consider this variable as a structural policy given the different exchange regimes that have characterized
the Chilean economy throughout the sample period, implying that the adjustment process follow by this relative
price have changed over time due to exchange rate policy decisions.21
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B.   Volatility and Resilience
Output volatility as measured by the 10-year rolling standard deviation of the output
gap reached peaks in the late 1970s and early 1980s as shown in Figure 15.  The differences
are such that during peak years the gap volatility reached up to 3 times that of the calmer
years, that is the 1960s and 1990s.   The volatility of some of the components of the output
gap also reached sustained peaks that extend from the mid 1970s to the early 1980s --that is
the case of the policy conditions and of the remainder.  In the case of international conditions22
peak volatility was reached in the mid-1980s.  Other domestic shocks have presented a
relatively stable and low volatility along the sample period.
Figure 15:  Volatility of GDP Gap and Components
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The peak in the GDP gap volatility cannot be associated to a single factor.  While it is
true that the volatility of the international conditions increased in a sustained fashion until the
mid-1980s and then declined, the volatility of policy conditions and of the remainder also
contributed to the peak.  As a consequence the increase and posterior fall of the volatility of
the output gap was much more marked than that of any individual component considered by
its own.
The volatility of the overall international conditions, and its real and financial
components reached a maximum in 1970-1990, falling markedly in the 1990s as presented in
Figure 16.  However, the reduction in the volatility of external conditions towards the last
decade in the sample period is not nearly as marked as that of the output gap or that of the
policy conditions.23
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Indeed, the volatility of the policy conditions component registered the largest
reduction, even more than that of the volatility of the output gap itself.  The latter suggests
that demand-management and structural policies have made an (economically) significant
contribution towards moderating the business cycle fluctuations —both in terms of
magnitude and amplitude—an outcome that reflects the strengthening of the macroeconomic
policy framework and a continue process of institutional building.  Looking at this result in a
more disaggregated fashion, while the volatilities associated to structural and monetary
policies fell to about half their previous values, the volatility of fiscal policy fell much
markedly.24
Resilience is commonly defined as the capacity to withstand shocks. Hence, it can be
understood as the capacity of the economy to limit the volatility of the output gap when
confronting exogenous shocks.  To measure resilience against external shocks —the most
important type of exogenous shocks confronted by the Chilean economy— we compute the
ratio of the volatility of external shocks to the volatility of the output gap.
25 As presented in
Table 6, resilience to external shocks deteriorated markedly in the seventies and eighties, to
improve sharply during the nineties, to a level slightly higher to that of the fifties and sixties.
The deterioration in the resilience to external shocks in the seventies and eighties was both
against external shocks of a financial and a real nature.  However, the subsequent recovery of
resilience during the nineties was concentrated in terms of external shocks of a financial
nature.
Table 6:  Resilience to External Shocks
(Volatility Ratios of External Conditions Against the Output Gap)
Total Financial Real
1950-1969 0.61 0.42 0.55
1970-1990 0.40 0.26 0.29
1991-2003 0.63 0.46 0.30
C.   Correlation and Synchronization
As the integration of the economy with the rest of the world deepens, the
synchronization of domestic business cycle with external conditions is expected to increase.
However, the evidence gathered in the previous section points toward an economy that has
become more resilient to external shocks. An interpretation that allows reconciling these
facts together is that policy actions can play a role of shock absorbers.  Hence, an improved
resilience against external shocks may result from a more effective contribution of policy
actions in stabilizing output.  For instance, a shift in the properties of the policy component,
from pro-cyclicality (positive correlation with the output gap) to countercyclicality (negative
correlation).
Over time, the Chilean business cycle has become increasingly associated to the international
conditions, with the correlation coefficient increasing from 0.45 in the first period (1950-
1969) to 0.6 in the second (1970-1989) and to almost 0.65 in the third (1990-2003).  In other
words, the domestic and external business cycle have indeed become more synchronized
(Figure 17).
                                                
25 An alternative way to look at resilience is by analyzing the contributions of the different components along
the cyclical downturn.  A preliminary analysis along this line is conducted in the appendix.25

















Policy Conditions Monet Policy Fiscal Policy Structural Policies
In sharp contrast with the pattern of increasing correlations commented above, the
correlation of policy conditions with the output gap increased only from the fifties and sixties
to the seventies and eighties, to drop dramatically so as to become almost zero during the
nineties, i.e. policy actions —which used to be highly pro-cyclical in the past— have played
a cyclically neutral role since the early nineties.  A closer look to the correlation with the
individual variables contained in the domestic policy component, shows that the reduction in
the correlations during the nineties has been widespread, but the shift from pro-cyclicality to
counter cyclicality is fully captured in terms of structural policies for the period as a whole.26
Hence, the continuous trade opening (which allows the trade balance to adjust more smoothly
to negative external shocks) as well as the increasingly flexible exchange rate (which
translates into an enhanced role of the real exchange rate as shock absorber) have been the
main contributors to the increased resilience throughout the nineties.  Monetary policy also
contributed to the elimination of the pro-cyclicality of policy conditions during the 1990s;
however, that is not the case for fiscal policy, since its correlation with the business cycle
remained stable as compared to that of the 1980s.
Although, as a whole, the countercyclical role of economic policies became evident
only in the last period (1990-2003), a more detailed look at the timing of the fall in the
correlation of domestic policies with the output gap (Figure 18) shows that the correlation
with fiscal policy started falling since the early eighties, but increased again in the mid
1990s, while the correlations with monetary and structural policies started falling in the late
eighties becoming negative over the last years in the sample.  The process has not been
continuous though, with some reversals associated to significant episodes in policy making.
Figure 18: Correlation of GDP Cycle vs. PolicyConditions Components
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Thus, the correlation of the output gap with structural policies fell sharply after the
widening of the exchange rate band was initiated (in 1991), reaching a negative value in the
mid 1990s.  The correlation increased towards 1998, probably associated to the narrowing of
the exchange rate band, and fell again from 1999 onwards, after the elimination of the band.
In the late eighties the correlation of monetary policy and the GDP gap was positive
and quite high (0.8). In the 1990s, as the independent Central Bank developed its inflation
targeting framework and gained credibility the correlation of the monetary policy component
fell continuously, with a short interruption in 1998 as a result of the episode of narrowing of
the exchange rate band and hike in interest rates that paved the way to the short-lived
recession experienced by the Chilean economy in 1999.  After that, the correlation has27
continued to fall, with monetary policy becoming counter-cyclical in 2002 and 2003. This
result reflects the full-fledged inflation targeting framework currently in place, and the
associated reduction in the interest rates over the last four years.
26
Finally the correlation of fiscal policy and the output gap fell markedly after the 1982
debt and banking crisis, even reaching negative values towards the latter part of the 1980s.
In the second half of the 1980s a strong economic recovery from the depressed post-crisis
conditions took place within the framework of a Fund supported program, which included an
important fiscal consolidation effort, which accounts for the negative correlation between the
output gap and the fiscal component.  However the correlation of the fiscal policy and the
GDP gap increased again during the 1990s, becoming positive in 1992 and reaching a
maximum in 1997 as fiscal policy regained its characteristic pro-cyclicality.   In this period, a
policy of constant nominal fiscal surpluses was pursued and, as a result, fiscal expenditures
reproduced the cyclical pattern of fiscal revenue, which is largely determined in Chile by
private spending due to the significant role of the VAT in total revenue.  Over the end of the
nineties, i.e., in the current administration of President Lagos, the pro-cyclicality of fiscal
policy has been corrected, by adopting a fiscal rule that allows automatic stabilizers to
operate fully across the cycle. Going forward, the operation of this fiscal rule should translate
in a correlation of the fiscal component with the business cycle converging towards zero.
Overall, the strengthening of the policy framework during the last period in the sample
(including the floating exchange rate regime, the adoption of the fiscal rule, and the further
refinements of the inflation targeting framework) seem to have played a significant role in
the observed increased resilience of the economy, which bodes well for such a positive
development to be sustainable going forward.
VI.   CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we estimate a VAR model fitted for the case of a small open economy
like Chile by means of introducing block exogeneity into the lag structure of the model.
First, to take a relatively long span view, we make use of an extended sample since the
1950s. Second, to better capture the characteristics of the Chilean economy, we include an
expanded set of variables that let us to account for the impact of external shocks (both of a
real and financial nature), and domestic shocks, including policy variables that capture both
demand management and structural policies, and other domestic shocks. With this toolkit, we
analyze the associated dynamic responses of the business cycle to several shocks (impulse
responses), the sources of business cycle fluctuations (variance decomposition), and the
shock resilience of the Chilean economy (historical decomposition).
Several interesting results emerge. First, in terms of the impulse response analysis,
real external shocks (domestic demand and terms of trade) have significant effects on
                                                
26 The latter have contributed to the recovery from the prolonged period of economic slowdown that followed
the downturn. According to most analysts, the negative output gap is expected to be closed at or around 2005.28
domestic economic activity. We provide evidence that the terms of trade, which reflects a
composite of exports and imports prices, better captures the dynamic response of the
economy than copper and oil prices by themselves. Furthermore, financial external shocks
are transmitted to the domestic economy through several channels, and do also have
significant effects on domestic economic activity. The significant impact in the cyclical
behavior of the economy following a shock in either the volatility of international financial
markets or net capital flows reflects the financial restrictions faced by an emerging economy
like Chile. Among domestic policy shocks, demand management policies (represented by
monetary policy and government spending) and structural policies (represented by the real
exchange rate and trade openness) significantly affect the business cycle fluctuations, as it is
also the case of other domestic shocks such as business confidence (represented by the stock
returns). On the contrary, we did not find evidence to support the belief that natural
catastrophes (droughts and earthquakes) have a significant impact on the economic activity.
Second, in terms of the variance decomposition analysis, we find, on one hand, that
foreign shocks have a substantial effect on business cycle volatility, especially external
demand and foreign equity (volatility) shocks, which have been the dominant source of
domestic output fluctuations. Other external shocks in order of importance and at some
distance include the terms of trade, net capital flows and international interest rates.
Monetary policy is the most important source of business cycle fluctuations among policy
variables following closely the contribution of the most important external shocks. On the
other hand, we find that structural and fiscal policy policies explain a relatively low fraction
of the business cycle fluctuations.
Finally, in terms of the historical decomposition analysis, we provide ample evidence
of an increased resilience of the Chilean economy during the nineties. Such a positive
development has taken place even as the deeper integration of the economy with the rest of
the world has resulted in an increased synchronization of the domestic business cycle with
international conditions, which underscores the significant countercyclical role played by
policies, particularly monetary and structural policies.
To highlight only the most straightforward policy implication of the results presented
in this paper, let us underscore that good policies matter, and demand management policies
are a necessary complement of structural policies. This is clearly demonstrated by the
increased resilience of the Chilean economy throughout the nineties, a period in which
domestic policies have been rather complementary. In the seventies and eighties profound
economic reforms were implemented, which undoubtedly played an important role in the
outstanding growth performance that took place in Chile between the mid-eighties and until
1997, i.e. before the prolonged slowdown period that resulted from the aftermath of the
Asian-Russian crisis and the unsupportive external environment that characterized the global
economy until recently. In terms of cyclical behavior, however, policies in the seventies and
eighties were highly pro-cyclical. As a result, the economy was vulnerable to external
shocks, and, indeed, two large recessions affected the economy during that period. Hence, the
incumbent and future Chilean economic authorities should continue on the path of
strengthening the macroeconomic policy framework, and skillfully managing it. If so, we29
should expect the Chilean economy to improve even more its already high level of shock
resilience. If not, resilience could perfectly deteriorate, and given the uncertainties embedded
in the global environment, the economy may come back to more turbulent times.
Regarding future research, adding more structure to the small open-economy VAR
could yield further insights by allowing a more accurate identification of shocks. In
particular, the changing policy framework over the last fifty years is an important barrier to
successfully fitting a more particular structure to the contemporaneous matrices implicit in
the VAR estimation. One way to tackle this issue is to pursue a similar study using quarterly
data for the last decade. Some preliminary exercises suggest that for a model fitted on a
quarterly sample that covers a shorter period, a structural VAR could potentially be well-
equipped to capture the dynamics of the data. Yet, taking into consideration the typical
autocorrelation pattern that characterizes data at this frequency, the number of variables
included in the VAR may need to be adequately streamlined.30
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APPENDIX
A.   Resilience and Cyclical Downturns: A Preliminary Analysis
The external shocks appear to have played an increasingly important role in the
cyclical downturns of output. Similarly for other domestic shocks, although at a much
smaller scale. Netting out from the GDP gap the remainder component (persistency and error
term), the external conditions explain on average for the period 1980-2003 about 68 percent
of the cyclical downturns, as compared to 38 percent for the whole sample.  Policy
conditions explain 30 percent of the cyclical contractions in GDP for the period 1980-2003
and 58 percent for the whole sample.  Other domestic shocks account only for about 1
percent in the latter period and 4 percent in the whole sample (Table A.1).
TABLE A.1: Decomposition of the Delta GDP Gap
From Cyclical Peak to Bottom 1/
(Percentage Explained by the Different Components)
International Policy Other
Conditions Conditions Shocks
1953-1954 59 1 4
1958-1959 44 52 4
1971-1975 58 9 6
1981-1983 70 27 3
1989-1990 -137 152 85
1997-2002 242 -47 -95
average 50-03 38 58 4
Average80-03 68 30 1
1/ Net of the remainder component.
Looking at individual episodes of downturns, the contribution of the international
conditions to the downturns appears to have been on the rise, explaining fully the 1997-2002
downturn, with policy conditions acting countercyclically and partly compensating the effect
of international conditions. Other domestic shocks appear to have played a minor role except
in the last two downturns, acting countercyclically in the last cyclical downturn (1997-2003)
and representing 85 percent of the 1989-1990 downturn. In that particular downturn,
international conditions improved, i.e. the “contributed” negatively to the downturn, which
was explained by policy conditions and other shocks. Finally, as reported in Section V,
policy conditions became countercyclical in the last downturn, with the relative contribution
of policies to the fluctuation of the output gap being negative (-47 percent).
Despite the increasing importance of external shocks in explaining the downturns, the
economy has become more resilient to external shocks also in terms of the characteristics of
the downturns.  The size of the downturns has become more reduced, at least partly as the
result of the countercyclical role played by policy conditions. As it can be seen in Figure A.1,33
the fall in the net output gap is much more reduced in the last two downturns (1989-1990 and
1997-2002) than in their two previous counterparts (1971-1975, and 1981-1983). Most
notably, in each of the two large downturns the effects of policy conditions played a very
significant role in the contraction. In 1971-75, policy conditions represented a contraction of
the output gap of -0.08. Similarly, in 1981-83, policy conditions explained a fall of -0.04 in
the output gap. In sharp contrast, in the 1997-2002 downturn, policies played a counter-
cyclical role contributing to partly compensate the contraction originated in the deteriorating
international conditions.
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